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Liability Under Section 1983
INTRODUCTION
Municipal immunity from a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.
section 1983' (section 1983) is a doctrine of the past. 2 A police
misconduct victim no longer is restricted to a cause of action
solely against the police officer involved.3 A potential deep pocket 4
now exists when plaintiffs allege that their civil rights were
deprived pursuant to a municipality's "policy or custom." '5
The United States Supreme Court first recognized municipal
liability when it interpreted the term "person," as used in section
I
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983).
2 See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
(allowing municipal liability in a § 1983 suit); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 638, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980) (municipality not accorded even qualified
immunity based upon its officers' good faith).
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-87 (1961), the United States Supreme
Court recognized the right of a citizen who is deprived of constitutional rights by police
misconduct to seek a remedy under § 1983 against the official who abused his position.
The complete municipal immunity for civil rights actions considered in Monroe was
specifically overruled in Monell. 436 U.S. at 663.
For a comprehensive discussion of governmental liability under Kentucky law, see
Snell, A Plea for a Comprehensive Governmental Liability Statute, 74 Ky. L.J. 521 (1985-
86).
See text accompanying note 33 infra.
See 436 U.S. at 694. "[I]t is when the execution of a government's policy or
custom, ... inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under §
1983." Id.
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1983,6 to include a municipal government.7 Rather than explicitly
articulating the extent of municipal liability,8 the court estab-
lished an analytical framework for municipal liability cases, while
leaving the specifics to the lower courts. 9 In Monell v. Depart-
ment of Social Services of New York,'0 the Supreme Court relied
upon an express city policy" to find municipal liability. In
Rymer v. Davis,2 a suit alleging police misconduct, the Sixth
Circuit extended Monell to find municipal liability where no
express policy existed. 3 The court upheld a recovery against the
city, ruling that the city's failure to train properly its police
officers constituted gross negligence. 4 Is this a logical extension
of Monel,'5 or should municipal liability stop short of municipal
inaction? 6 This Comment examines the federal courts'
interpretation 7 of the United States Supreme Court's municipal
6 See note I supra.
1 See 436 U.S. at 700-01.
See id. at 695. "MWe ... do not address, what the full contours of municipal
liability under § 1983 may be .... [Wle expressly leave further development of this
action to another day." Id.
9 See notes 54-120 infra and accompanying text. See generally Schnapper, Civil
Rights After Monell, 79 CoLun. L. Ry. 213, 214 (1979) (discussing the "new, and
more complex, set of issues" raised by Monell).
10 436 U.S. at 658 (action challenging policies requiring pregnant employees to
take unpaid leaves of absence before medically necessary).
I d. at 660-61 n.2 (forced maternity leave after the fifth month of pregnancy).
2 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff brought a § 1983 action including the
city as a defendant after police officers severely beat him), vacated sub nom., City of
Shepherdsville, Kentucky v. Rymer, 105 S. Ct. 3518 (1985) (remanded for further
consideration in light of City of Oldahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985)), aff'd
on remand, 775 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1985).
'3 Id. at 200-01.
I4 d. (The city gave its police officers "carte blanche authority" when making
arrests.).
11 See, e.g., Saranello & Griffiths, Pleading Municipal Liability in Police Miscon-
duct Actions, 44 Tax. B.J. 1339, 1340 (1981) ("[P]lead as many policies or customs as
may exist.").
36 Circuit Judge Garth, in Commonwealth v. Porter, equated an absence of af-
firmative action with an absence of causation, thereby declining to find liability. Com-
monwealth v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 325 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121
(1982). See text accompanying note 62 infra. See also Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp.
1130, 1136 (D. Conn. 1978) (Mere inaction by a supervisor is inadequate absent the
knowledge of subordinates' pattern of unconstitutional actions.).
'1 The United States Supreme Court ruled that state courts may entertain § 1933
suits in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (19'20).
This Comment, however, focuses on federal court suits.
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liability theory and attempts to determine the extent to which a
municipality wil be held liable under section 1983.
I. THE BIRTH OF MUNICIPAL LLABILrrY:
THE KING CAN Do SOME WRONG' S
In Monroe v. Pape,19 which marked the modern era of
section 1983 litigation, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that section 1983 creates a cause of action against a police officer
who wrongfully deprives a person of his civil rights. The Court
refused, however, to extend section 1983 liability to a munici-
pality.20 After examining the legislative history of section 1983,21
the Court concluded that, because Congress rejected the Sher-
man Amendment" to the Civil Rights Act, 2 Congress could not
have intended the word "person" as used in the Act to include
a municipality.24 In fact, only months after passage of section
1983, Congress had enacted a statute defining "person" to "ex-
tend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate ... ."25 The
Court noted, however, that the definition was "merely an allow-
able, not a mandatory one." 26 Using this interpretation, the
Court held that section 1983 creates a cause of action against
police officers for the deprivation of constitutional rights by
" See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 970 (4th ed. 1971)
(The doctrine of sovereign immunity originated from the medieval maxim "the King can
do no wrong.").
'9 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Dept. of Social
Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (rejecting municipal immunity). The Court
found that § 1983 creates a cause of action for persons deprived of federal rights by
police misconduct, even though the state did not authorize the conduct. The plaintiff
was limited, however, to recovery only from the officer involved. Id.
Id. at 187.
2, See CONG. GLOBE 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 653-66 (1871).
n Id. at 663. "The Amendment would have held a municipal corporation liable
for damages done to the person or property of its inhabitants by private persons...."
Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 664 (1978) (emphasis in
original).
3 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, c. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1981)).
14 See 365 U.S. at 191. (The Court viewed Congress' reaction to the Sherman
Amendment as "so antagonistic that we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used
in this particular act to include [municipalities].").
2 Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431.
15 365 U.S. at 190-91.
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police misconduct, 27 but that municipalities could not be held
liable for such misconduct.2 1
Although the Court reaffirmed its view of municipal immu-
nity several times after Monroe,29 it ultimately recognized mu-
nicipal liability under section 1983 in Monell v. Department of
Social Services of New York 0 After a thorough reexamination
of the legislative history,3' the Monell Court held that a munic-
ipality was indeed a person within the meaning of section 198332
and "therefore [could] be sued directly under section 1983 for
monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief. ' 33 In rejecting mu-
nicipal immunity, the Court ruled that a municipality could be
held liable when the alleged deprivation of civil rights was pur-
suant to a city's policy or custom. 3 4 The Court explicitly added,
however, that this new-found liability could not be based upon
a respondeat superior theory, 15 stating, "Congress did not in-
tend section 1983 liability to attach where ... causation was
absent."3
6
The scope of municipal liability was further refined in Owen
v. City of Independence,37 in which the Supreme Court refused
to accord a municipality qualified immunity based upon its
officers' or agents' good faith. 38 The Court expounded that
See id. at 171-87.
See id. at 187.
See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 710, reh'g denied sub nom.,
412 U.S. 963 (1973) (concluding that municipal governments cannot be liable under §
1983); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973) (extending municipal
immunity to injunctive actions under § 1983).
" 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
3' Id. at 690-701. Here, the Court found that the Sherman Amendment was a
form of riot legislation that could impose vicarious liability upon a municipality and
concluded that there was "no justification for excluding municipalities from the 'persons'
covered by [§ 1983]." Id. at 701.
32 See id. at 701.
11 Id. at 690.
See id. at 690-91; note 5 supra.
" 436 U.S. at 691. "[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it enploys
a tortfeasor. . . ." Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 692.
37 445 U.S. 622 (1980). A former police chief brought a § 1983 suit against the
city alleging that he was discharged in violation of his constitutional rights. The court
of appeals had held that the city was entitled to qualified immunity from liability.
"' Id. at 638. "[T]here is no tradition of immunity for municipal corporations,
and neither history nor policy supports a construction of § 1983 that would justify the
qualified immunity accorded the city ... by the Court of Appeals." Id.
[Vol. 74
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section 1983 "[bly its terms, . . . 'creates a species of tort
liability that on its face admits of no immunities.'... Its lan-
guage is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any
privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted."
39
II. MuNiciPAL LIABILITY IN TH FEDERAL COURTS
In a traditional section 1983 "color of law" suit, a plaintiff
must show "an act taken under color of state law which results
in the deprivation of a constitutional right and such deprivation
must have resulted in injury to the plaintiff." 4° In Monell v.
Department of Social Services of New York,41 the United States
Supreme Court established a two-part test that a plaintiff must
satisfy in addition to the traditonal elements. When a munic-
ipality is a defendant in a section 1983 acton, the plaintiff must
show both that the alleged wrongdoing constitutes a municipal
custom or policy,42 and that such custom or policy caused the
employee conduct responsible for the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights. 43
Although the Supreme Court has clearly established the ex-
istence of section 1983 municipal liability, 44 a problem remains
in finding a workable definition of policy or custom.45 The
Monell Court easily identified an express city policy.46 Justice
Powel 4 7 explained that Monell was "the clear case, ' 48 but that
1 Id. at 635 (citation omitted) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417
(1976)).
"1 Freilich, Rushing & Noland, Undermining Municipal and State Initiative in an
Era of Crisis and Uncertainty, in SWORD AND SHIELD 48 (R. Freilich & R. Carlisle eds.
1983). See also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (plaintiff must make only
two allegations for a cause of action: (1) that he was deprived of a federal right, (2) by
some person acting under color of state law). See generally J. Mahoney, The Prima
Facie § 1983 Case, SwoRD AND SHmLD, supra at 119-36.
• 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
42 See note 5 supra.
11 436 U.S. at 658. Section 1983 language "plainly imposes liability on a govern-
ment that, under color of some official policy, 'causes' an employee to violate another's
constitutional rights." Id.
" See notes 30-40 supra and accompanying text.
41 See note 8 supra.
6 436 U.S. at 660-61, 661 n.2. See notes 10-11 supra.
4 Id. at 704-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
41 Id. at 713. "This case involves ... formal, written policies of a municipal
department.... ." Id.
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"[d]ifficult questions nevertheless remain for another day." '49
Very few fact patterns fall into the clear case category that
Monell exemplifies.5 0 The cases become more difficult when the
municipal policy or custom is an unexpressed one.
Perhaps due to the Court's strong tone in Owen v. City of
Independence,5' the trend after Owen seems to be "toward the
imposition of liability in an ever-widening circle."52 At the same
time, however, caution must be exercised because the Court has
explicitly rejected liability under a respondeat superior theory.53
As pointed out, the existence of a formal written policy creates
the easy case. The hard case, and thus the focus of this Com-
ment, is the extent of municipal liability where no formal policy
or readily identifiable custom exists, such as when a city has
allegedly failed properly to train, supervise or discipline a police
force.
A. The Narrow Application of the Policy or Custom Test
In Rizzo v. Goode5 4 the United States Supreme Court re-
quired an "affirmative link ' 55 between the police misconduct
,9 Id. "There are substantial line-drawing problems in determining 'when execution
of a government's policy or custom' can be said to inflict constitutional injury such that
'government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. " Id.
- For examples of clear cases, see Sala v. County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207, 209
(2d Cir. 1979) (strip search was police department's official procedure), vacated, 446
U.S. 903 (1980) (remanded for further consideration in light of Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980)); Garner v. Memphis, 600 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1979)
(police officers taught to shoot fleeing felons), rev'd on other grounds after remand,
710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd sub nom., Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694
(1985); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 832 (2d Cir. 1977) (city's child welfare
department employees given a manual describing procedures).
51 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (The Supreme Court held that a municipality will not be
accorded qualified immunity, even based on the good faith of its officials.). See notes
39-40 supra and accompanying text.
12 Leuchtman, Joint Liability in Police Misconduct Cases, 60 MICH. B.J. 93, 96
(1981).
" 436 U.S. at 691. The Court interpreted Congress' intent to impose § 1983
liability only where causation between the municipality and the tort existed and not
solely upon the basis of an employer-employee relationship. Id. at 692.
s, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (section 1983 class action against city officials for alleged
police misconduct).
" Id. at 371. The Court required an "affirmative link between the occurrence of
the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by
petitioners-express or otherwise-showing their authorization or approval of such mis-
conduct." Id.
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and the municipal official56 being sued in a section 1983 case.
At least one circuit court57 has relied upon this affirmative link
requirement to restrict the extent of municipal liability in inac-
tion cases.58 In Commonwealth v. Porter,9 one opinion 6° applied
Rizzo's affirmative link requirement to equate the absence of
affirmative action with the absence of causation, 6' arguing that
"there must be a causal link between the actions of the respon-
sible officials named and the challenged misconduct." 62 Another
opinion, 63 however, stated that Rizzo does not require such a
narrow viewA4
Another approach that narrows Monell's application was
applied recently in the Fourth6 5 and Fifth6 Circuits, and appar-
ently requires both67 a policy and a custom as prerequisites to
municipal liability.
6 Rizzo, decided two years before the existence of municipal liability under §
1983, was not an action against a municipality but rather against individual officials
such as the mayor and police chief. Id. at 367.
Commonwealth v. Porter, 659 F.2d 306, 336 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982) (Pennsylvania brought a § 1983 action against borough
officials alleging acquiescence and ratification of conduct depriving persons of their civil
rights.). Id. at 309.
" Id. at 310 (inaction by falling to supervise a police officer after knowledge of
his use of excessive force).
-1 659 F.2d 306. One commentator called Commonwealth v. Porter "analytical
confusion" which should "be viewed as an aberration that runs afoul of Monell." Note,
Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Failure To Act As "Custom or Policy",
29 WAYNE L. REv. 1225, 1243-44 (1982-83).
60 659 F.2d at 325 (opinion of Judge Garth). Porter was per curiam with two
opinions, neither of which commanded the majority of the court.
1I Id. at 336. "[Ihe requirements of Rizzo v. Goode... must be satisfied. Thus,
the officials' misconduct cannot be merely a failure to act. Such officials must have
played an affirmative role in the deprivation of the plaintiffs' rights.. . ." Id. (citation
omitted).
62 Id.
6- See id. at 324 (opinion of Judge Gibbons).
14 See id. at 324. "Rizzo v. Goode does not require the adoption of an ordinance
saying in so many words 'we direct that the constitution be violated' before an inference
can be drawn of the existence of an official policy of encouragement of such violations.
Inaction ... can convey a potent message." Id.
See Wellington v. Daniels, 717 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1983) (section 1983 action
based upon a failure to properly train and supervise police officers).
16 See Languirand v. Hayden, 717 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (section 1983 suit
claiming inadequate police training caused plaintiff's injury), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2656 (1984).
1, Monell requires a policy or custom. 436 U.S. at 690-91. Although one may be
indicative of another, a finding of either should be sufficient.
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In Languirand v. Hayden,6" a suit against the city claimed
that inadequate police training caused plaintiff's injury, 69 and
alleged a "policy or custom of the City ... of placing armed
officers on the streets without adequate training." 70 The court
concluded that the plaintiff must show both a policy of failure
to train constituting gross negligence and evidence of a pattern
of similar incidents of police misconduct. 71 Although it was clear
that the officer received no formal training,72 the court held that
the evidence was insufficient to find municipal liability73 unless
a pattern of similar incidents was also shown.
A pattern of similar incidents was also required in Wellington
v. Daniels.74 There the complaint alleged a failure properly to
train and supervise police officers in using flashlights as weap-
ons.75 The plaintiff was injured when a police officer wielding a
flashlight hit him in the head. 76 Although the chief of police
knew both the dangers of using flashlights as weapons and that
his officers used them for protection without receiving any pro-
hibitions or restrictions, 77 the court rejected the finding of a
policy, requiring that a pattern of similar incidents be shown
before a -policy could be established. 78
An even narrower interpretation of the Monell policy or
custom test was applied in Jones v. City of Philadelphia.79 The
city was sued under section 1983 for the municipality's alleged
deprivation of civil rights through "their deliberate acts and
gross and reckless negligence in failing to adequately train, su-
61 717 F.2d 220.
69 Id. at 222-23.
71 Id. at 222.
- 1' See id. at 227-28.
72 Id. at 228 (officer admitted that he had not received formal firearms training).
71 Id. at 230 (The court acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence to find
the city police chief grossly negligent in sending the officer on patrol without more
training.).
74 717 F.2d at 936. "A single act or isolated incidents are normally insufficient to
establish supervisory inaction upon which to predicate § 1983 liability." Id.
71 Id. at 934.
76 Id. (The injuries caused "complete body paralysis and severe reduction in mental
capacity.").
See id. at 934-35.
78 Id. at 937 (The plaintiff was unable to show more than one incident in which
the victim was injured.)
79 491 F. Supp. 284, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
[Vol. 74
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pervise and discipline the individual officers." 80 The court re-
sponded:
It is clear that plaintiffs have not, ... alleged a government
policy or custom which might give rise to municipal liability
under the standards set forth in Monell. .... Indeed, even the
'deliberate act' of a city official, absent the trappings of offi-
cial policy or custom, will not serve as a basis for municipal
liability under § 1983.!
The "trappings of official policy or custom" requirement
has been viewed as requiring formalism in policymaking before
liability can be imposed. 82 This interpretation requires an ex-
tremely narrow view of the Monell test, which explicitly does
not require that a formal policy exist.83
B. The Broad Interpretation of Monell
Courts favoring plaintiffs in section 1983 suits against mu-
nicipalities seem to ground their decisions in causation rather
than a showing of official policy.8 In 1943,11 California recog-
nized that a city could be held liable for its negligent failure to
supervise or discipline police officers.8 6 Although today most
courts will not hold a municipality liable for simple negligence, 87
1 Id. The plaintiffs claimed that, because of their race, a conspiracy existed to
assault and then arrest them without probable cause. Id. at 286.
Id. at 287.
See Schnapper, supra note 9, at 219 (If the test were interpreted narrowly to
include only the formal decisions of the highest officials, then a municipality could
delegate authority to lower level officials, thereby escaping all liability for potentially
unconstitutional decisions.).
' 436 U.S. at 691.
See notes 93-116 infra and accompanying text.
' See Fernelius v. Pierce, 138 P.2d 12, 14 (Cal. 1943) (decision based on a breach
of duty, not a § 1983 suit).
Id. at 17. "It is negligent to use an instrumentality, whether a human being or
a thing, which the actor knows or should know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or
defective, that its use involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others." (quoting
RESTATEiMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 307, at 833 (1963)).
See Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869, 871-72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 833 (1982); Owens v. Haaz, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1980); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D.R.I.
1978). Each of these cases explicitly considered and rejected simple negligence as a cause
of action.
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many courts are finding municipal liability for gross negligence
without a showing of an explicit policy or custom."' According
to one court, 89 this is the "most expansive view of Monell."' 0
One of the first decisions after Monell to apply this expansive
view9 was Leite v. City of Providence,92 in which the plaintiff
based his section 1983 suit on the city's alleged failure properly
to hire and train its police force. 93 The court concluded that,
although a section 1983 suit against a municipality cannot be
based upon simple negligence, 94 a city can be liable "[i]f the
plaintiff's injury results from the complete lack of training or
grossly inadequate training of a police force. . . -95 The city
may be deemed to be "acquiescing in and implicitly authorizing
such violations"96 when the training or lack thereof is so inad-
equate that "future police misconduct is almost inevitable." 9 7
This recognition of municipal liability for mere inaction was
quite broad in itself. Nevertheless, the court also announced that
persons did not have to "endure a 'pattern' of past police
"' See notes 94-116 infra. See also Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644, 652
(5th Cir. 1979) (recognizing a cause of action against a city that is reckless or grossly
negligent in training, supervising, or disciplining police officers); White v. Rochford,
592 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1979) (The court stated: "It is clearly established that
although officials may not be held liable for simple negligence, they may be held liable
for 'gross negligence' or 'reckless disregard' for the safety of others."); McQurter v.
City of Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. 1401, 1421 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (liability based upon reckless
disregard of foreseeable consequences amounting to gross negligence), appeal dismissed
on other grounds, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984).
19 Barry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1982) (In a § 1983 action against
the city, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to find a policy.).
10 Id. The court expressly declined to rule upon whether this interpretation is
correct. Id. at 33 n.l.
, Id.
92 463 F. Supp. 585, 587 (D.R.I. 1978) (plaintiff alleged five city police officers
verbally and physically abused him).
I1 d. at 591 (plaintiff alleged simple negligence and was given leave to amend
because the degree of culpability required to hold the city liable was a novel question).
See id. 590-91. "[A] city cannot be held liable for simple negligent training of
its police force. . . ." Id. at 590.
"I Id. at 591. "[Sluch an injury is not the result of mere negligence but the result
of a deliberate and conscious indifference by the city." Id.
Id. at 590.
17 Id. "In light of the responsibility, authority and force that police normally
wield, a municipality is fairly considered to .have actual or imputed knowledge of the
almost inevitable consequences that arise from nonexistent or grossly inadequate training
of a police force." Id. at 590-91.
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misconduct before they could sue the city under section 1983."9,
Several courts soon followed Leite's broad interpretation. In
Popow v. City of Margate" the court used Leite's reasoning to
affirm municipal liability where the city's training was so "grossly
negligent as to make future police misconduct almost inevita-
ble."' ' 0 In fact, the Popow court went a step beyond Leite,
ruling that, if a city's procedure for disciplining police officers
is "so inadequate as to ratify unconstitutional conduct, the city
may be liable under section 1983."101
The Second Circuit followed this broad view of municipal
liability in finding that liability may be based on a single incident
of policy misconduct.'02 In Owens v. Haas,0 3 the court reiterated
the Leite view that a municipality can be liable for its failure to
properly train or supervise its police forcees and recognized that
"[w]hile some causal link must be made between the county's
failure to train and the violation of constitutional rights, a single
brutal incident such as this may be sufficient to suggest that
link."'0 5 In Turpin v. Mailet,10 the Second Circuit further broad-
ened its application of the Monell test. The court stated that
official policy can be inferred from informal acts as well as
municipal supervisory officials' omissions'0 and that "if the City
... impliedly or tacitly authorized, approved or encouraged
" See id. at 590 (recognizing that a policy may exist without a custom). But see
notes 70-78 supra and accompanying text.
"1 476 F. Supp. 1237, 1240 (D.N.J. 1979) (Police officer who was pursuing another
man mistakenly shot and killed plaintiff's decendent in front of decendent's house.).
"I Id. at 1246 (No training was given regarding shooting at a moving target, night
shooting, or shooting in a residential area.).
I Id. at 1246-47. "[P]ersistent failure to discipline or control subordinates in the
face of knowledge of their propensity for improper use of force may constitute an
official custom or defacto policy, actionable under § 1983." Id. (emphasis in original).
1 2 See 601 F.2d at 1246 (Approximately seven guards beat the plaintiff, resulting
in lacerations, bruises and lasting impairments.). Id. at 1245. Contra 670 F.2d at 32
(isolated instance of police misconduct was insufficient).
101 601 F.2d 1242.
,14 The failure must meet the requisite degree of culpability. See id. at 1246.
"I Id. "[Tihe circumstances of this severe beating are such as to suggest official
acquiescence on some level." Id. at 1247.
" 619 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016(1980) (section 1983
action claiming failure to discipline police officers gave rise to violation of constitutional
rights).
117 Id. at 201. "We see no reason why an official policy cannot be inferred from
the omissions of a municipality's supervisory officials, as well as from its acts." Id.
1985-86]
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harrassment of... [the victim], it promulgated an official policy
within the meaning of Monell."'0
Recently, in Rymer v. Davis,109 the Sixth Circuit, expressly
followed this broad reading of Monell."0 The court reiterated
its municipal liability theory announced previously in Hays v.
Jefferson County,"' which allowed a section 1983 suit based on
a city's failure to properly train police that was so reckless or
grossly negligent that police misconduct was nearly certain to
occur in the future." 2 The Rymer Court permitted the inference
of a municipal custom from the lack of a proper training
program" 3 and stated that "the type or amount of training
necessary to avoid the inference of a custom that authorizes or
condones police misconduct is properly a jury question."" 4 The
Sixth Circuit also agreed with Owens "that official acquiescence
may be inferred from the lack of training even in the face of
only a single brutal incident of police misconduct." 1 5 The court
commented, however, that a general failure to train would not
be sufficient in itself, rather "there must exist a causal relation-
ship between the failure to train and the conduct of the police
officer.... 11I16
In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,"7 the United States
Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to settle the con-
103 Id.
'- 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1985), vacated, City of Shepherdsville, Kentucky v.
Rymer, 105 S. Ct. 3518 (1985), aff'd on remand, 775 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1985). The
plaintiff was arrested, violently beaten and jailed without medical attention. He subse-
quently filed a § 1983 complaint that included the city as a defendant. Id.
11 See id. at 200-01. "[A] municipal custom that authorizes or condones police
misconduct can be inferred when the municipality has failed to train or has been grossly
negligent in training its police force." Id.
" 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). In Hays, the
court recognized municipal liability for complete failure to train or for grossly negligent
training. Id. at 874. The Hays plaintiff, however, alleged only simple negligence which
was an insufficient degree of culpability. Id. at 871-72.
"1 754 F.2d at 200.
" See note 107 supra.
'4 754 F.2d at 201 n.l (The court found sufficient evidence to send the question
to the jury because the police officer in question had received no training in arrest
procedures.). Id. at 201.
'i Id.
116 Id. (The plaintiff showed that the city lacked supervisory regulations for arrests
and that the manner of arrests was left up to the individual police officer.).
11 105 S. Ct. 2427, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 16 (1985) (holding that proof of a
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troversy surrounding Monell's policy or custom test. Tuttle in-
volved a section 1983 suit resulting from an Oklahoma City
police officer's fatally shooting the plaintiff's husband. The
Court, however, did not decide the difficult issue whether a
municipality may be liable for a single act of brutality when an
inadequate training policy is shown to exist."18 Instead, the Court
reversed the lower court's decision based upon the trial judge's
jury instructions, which allowed the imposition of municipal
liability even if the jury believed that the officer's training was
adequate. The Court concluded that a single, unusually brutal
act could not establish, by itself, an inadequate training policy." 9
This holding is consistent with Rymer, which requires a showing
of both inadequate training and the existence of a causal rela-
tionship before a single incident creates municipal liability. 20
C. Analysis
Section 1983 was "intended to give a broad remedy for
violations of federally protected civil rights."' 2' Legislative
intent 2 2 and public policy considerations 23 justify extending li-
ability to municipalities. After recognizing the express federal
remedy that Congress created, 24 the Supreme Court, in Owen
v. City of Independence,'25 remarked:
single incident is not sufficient to impose liability without proof that municipal policy
caused the incident).
M' Id. at 2436 n.7 (Court declined to express an opinion on whether a policy of
inadequate training can meet the Monell test).
Id. at 2435-36.
'z See note 113 supra and accompanying text. The United States Supreme Court
remanded Rymer to the Sixth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Tuttle. See 105 S.
Ct. 3518. The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its Rymer decision, stating that "Tuttle is not
controlling; rather this case presents the exact issue upon which the Court refused to
express an opinion." See Rymer v. Davis, No. 83-5586, slip op. at 3 (6th Cir. Oct. 28,
1985).
121 Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). The
Court concluded that Congress intended § 1983 to be broadly construed. Id. at 685-86.
1 See 436 U.S. at 690-91.
'-' See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-51 (1980) (The Court
found congressional intent and public policy sufficient to reject even a qualified munic-
ipal immunity.).
12 See id.
W Id. at 651.
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How 'uniquely amiss' it would be, therefore, if the gov-
ernment itself-'the social organ to which all in our society
look for promotion of liberty, justice, fair and equal treatment,
and the setting of worthy norms and goals for social con-
duct'-were permitted to disavow liability for the injury it has
begotten.,26
The Court hoped that providing municipal liability for sec-
tion 1983 civil rights deprivations would act as a deterrent' 27 to
such violations, thereby encouraging municipalities to refrain
from or take action against potential constitutional infringe-
ments.' 2 The Court's language in Owen suggests that a munic-
ipality has a responsibility to assure that abuses be kept to a
minimum.
The Court's broad language cannot be read to impose strict
liability upon a municipality. 29 This language, however, has led
courts'30 to rely heavily upon causation,' as opposed to search-
ing strictly for a policy or custom, when deciding municipal
liability under section 1983. In Monroe v. Pape,132 the Court
stated that it is unnecessary to allege a willful act, but that
section 1983 "should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural conse-
quences of his actions.' 3 In Owen, the Court further stated
I6 d. (The Court emphasized the importance of a damages remedy for "vindicating
cherished constitutional guarantees," especially when the "wrongdoer is the institution
that has been established to protect the very rights it has transgressed.")
'1" See id. "§ 1983 was intended not only to provide compensation to the victims
of past abuses, but to serve as a deterrent against future constitutional deprivations, as
well." Id.
" See id. at 651-52.
The knowledge that a municipality will be liable for all its injurious
conduct, ... should create an incentive for officials who may harbor
doubts about the lawfulness of their intended actions to err on the side of
protecting citizens' constitutional rights. Furthermore, the threat that dam-
ages might be levied against the city may encourage those in a policy
making position to institute internal rules and programs designed to min-
imize the likelihood of unintentional infringements on constitutional rights.
Id.
12 See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
1"0 See notes 91-116 supra and accompanying text.
' But see notes 68-82 supra and accompanying text.
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
,13 Id. at 187.
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that "[e]lemental notions of fairness dictate that one who causes
a loss should bear the loss. 1' 34 This notion of fairness is clearly
seen in the Court's expression of the policy behind municipal
liability:
[I]t is fairer to allocate any resulting financial loss to the
inevitable costs of government borne by all the taxpayers, than
to allow its impact to be solely felt by those whose rights....
have been violated.
... No longer is individual 'blameworthiness' the acid test
of liability; the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined
fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official miscon-
duct.,35
By requiring a policy or custom before imposing municipal
liability, yet declining to expound further, 36 the Supreme Court
left much interpretation to the lower courts. Some courts have
gone as far as inferring liability from inaction 37 while others
require an affirmative act'31 or formal policy' 39 to justify munic-
ipal liability for police misconduct. Eric Schnapper, one of the
attorneys for the petitioners in Monell, voiced a common con-
cern about such uncertainty: "The answers ultimately arrived at
will determine whether the victims of constitutional violations
1,4 45 U.S. at 654. See PROSSER, supra note 18, § 2, at 7 (purpose of a civil action
for a tort is to compensate a victim "for the damage he has suffered at the expense of
the wrongdoer").
445 U.S. at 655-57.
See note 8 supra.
'" See, e.g., Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1008 (1982) (lack of adequate police disciplinary procedures gave rise to
municipal liability); Brandon v. Allen, 516 F. Supp. 1355, 1361 (W.D. Tenn. 1981)
(liability resulting from a superior's failure to act when he knows or should know of a
police officer's dangerous propensities), rev'd, 719 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub
nom., Brandon v. Holt, 105 S. Ct. 873 (1985); McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 572 F.
Supp. 1401, 1420-21 (N.D. Ga. 1983), appeal dismissed, 724 F.2d 881 (11th Cir. 1984)
(promotion of supervisory officers without chokehold training constituted a level of
recklessness sufficient to invoke municipal liability); notes 92-116 supra and accompa-
nying text.
' See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 80-82 supra and accompanying text.
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are to have a meaningful new remedy, or whether Monell is to
be drained of meaning by exceptions and qualifications."'4
CONCLUSION
Before Monell,41 a municipality was simply subject to criti-
cism or embarrassment for its police officers' misconduct. Reme-
dies for such constitutional injuries were restricted to actions
against the officers involved, 42 often leaving a victim without a
sufficiently "deep pocket." The establishment of municipal lia-
bility under section 1983,'143 however, offers a more sufficient
remedy. Municipalities cannot be held liable under section 1983
merely because they employ a tortfeasor, 44 but they must be
held to a degree of responsibility when their policies or customs
infringe upon a citizen's constitutional rights. A municipality
cannot operate in a vacuum without giving any consideration to
the consequences impacted on the citizens it is established to
serve. When a city puts a police officer on the street without
any training or with training so inadequate that abuse is sure to
occur, can the officer be held solely to blame? On the contrary,
it seems consistent with the policy underlying municipal liability'45
to hold a municipality ultimately responsible for police miscon-
duct when the city, through either action or inaction, fails to
minimize foreseeable abuses. A policy of inaction is policy none-
theless.
It is understandable that courts are hesitant to apply munic-
ipal liability broadly, considering its relative youth in comparison
to the age old doctrine of municipal immunity. Municipal lia-
bility is here, however, and for it to have any practical meaning
it must not be limited so extensively that it is ineffective. On the
other hand, caution must be exercised to keep municipal liability
within certain limits; as the Sixth Circuit expressed," [t]here must
exist a causal relationship.' ' 46
Clinton J. Elliott
141 Schnapper, supra note 9, at 214.
141 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
141 See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
141 See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
I" See notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
141 See notes 117-20 supra and accompanying text.
1 Rymer v. Davis, 754 F.2d 198, 201 (6th Cir. 1985).
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